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Mijnheer de Rector Magnifi cus, zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders, 
The 3
rd
 of October 2005 was not only the latest anniversary of 
Leiden’s liberation from the Spaniards. While we, in Leiden, 
were enjoying white bread, herring and the traditional hutspot, 
the Member States of the European Union decided to open 
accession negotiations with the Republic of Turkey. Some 
would say that taking that decision was just as tough as ending 
the siege of Leiden. Indeed, many Member States worry about 
possible negative consequences of Turkish EU membership. 
These fears are refl ected in the so-called ‘Negotiating 
Framework for Turkey’, adopted the same day by the 25 
Member States. It is a short document which sets out the 
principles, the contents and the modalities of the enlargement 
negotiations.
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At fi rst sight, the Negotiating Framework for Turkey resembles 
the frameworks that were adopted hitherto with respect to 
previous candidates for EU membership. But as often, the devil 
is in the detail. The document contains caveats and precautions 
of a new form, inserted to reassure the existing Member States. 
Indeed, some elements of the framework may be regarded as 
fallback strategies, that is to say strategies for the EU to delay, if 
not to prevent Turkish membership. 
Consider for instance the second paragraph of the Framework. 
It states that while accession is a shared objective, the 
negotiations are nonetheless ‘an open process, the outcome of 
which cannot be guaranteed beforehand.’ It also stipulates that, 
should accession not take place, it must be ensured that 
‘Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through 
the strongest possible bonds’. While it is true that negotiations 
are always open-ended, the mention of alternatives to 
accession, right from the start of the negotiation process is, 
in itself, remarkable. 
Another innovative element can be found in paragraph 13 of 
the Negotiating Framework. This paragraph sets a date before 
which, in any event, Turkey’s accession to the Union cannot 
take place. More precisely, it states that Turkey cannot join 
before the Member States have decided on the EU budget for 
the period starting in 2014. While the ‘absorption capacity’ of 
the Union is an established enlargement condition,
3
 the 
Negotiating Framework for Turkey goes one step further by 
specifying the contents of this condition.
The novelty upon which I would like to dwell concerns the 
tools available to the current Member States to alleviate 
possible negative implications of Turkish membership once 
Turkey has entered the Union. In this respect, the key phrase in 
the Negotiating Framework goes as follows: ‘[l]ong transitional 
periods, derogations, specifi c arrangements or permanent 
safeguard clauses…may be considered’.
4
 
Transition periods and temporary derogations to the application 
of EU rules are well-known topics of membership negotiations, 
and have traditionally been an integral part of accession treaties.
5
 
What intrigues me in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey is 
the mention of permanent safeguard clauses which the 
document defi nes as ‘clauses which are permanently available as 
a basis for safeguard measures’. It also specifi es that such 
mechanisms may be envisaged in areas such as freedom of 
movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture. 
What could this mean in practice? Imagine that Turkey has 
been accepted as a Member of the Union. On a permanent 
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basis, other Member States and/or EU institutions would have 
the possibility of suspending the right of Turkish nationals to 
move freely within the internal market. Similarly, they could 
decide to differentiate between Turkey and the other Member 
States as regards the allocation of funds under the agricultural 
and structural policies. 
The stated rationale of such arrangements is to protect the 
achievements of the European integration process against 
possible disturbances following the accession of a new Member 
State. However, I would argue that the permanent possibility to 
limit notably the free movement of persons could 
paradoxically constitute an erosion, not a protection of core 
elements of the so-called acquis communautaire, which is the 
body of rules and principles underpinning European 
integration.
6
 Put in more colloquial language, the Member 
States are trying to have their cake and eat it. 
This paradox begs the following questions: Are the Member 
States allowed to do such a thing? Can they, from a legal point 
of view, insert any clauses they want in the accession treaty? 
Some would say yes. Given that the accession treaty is in 
principle a purely intergovernmental treaty,
7
 Member States 
should be free to decide its contents. I intend to argue that this 
assertion should however be qualifi ed, by demonstrating that 
A) there are indeed limits to the Member States’ discretion in 
enlargement negotiations,
8
 and 
B) that, should they cross those limits, the Member States ought 
not to feel entirely safe from judicial scrutiny, even though they 
may be acting outside of the Community framework. 
In raising these issues, it is not my intention to take any 
position as to the expediency or otherwise of Turkey’s 
accession to the EU. I want simply to identify the legal 
parameters within which the accession negotiations will go 
forward. Of course, I am perfectly well aware that politics, not 
law, will determine the outcome of the negotiations. However, 
if there are serious legal objections to some elements of the 
negotiating framework, that may have some consequences at 
the political level, by either facilitating or impeding the 
formation of an acceptable compromise.
Allow me fi rst to highlight the principles limiting the 
discretion of Member States qua negotiators and contracting 
parties to an accession treaty; I will then suggest the ways in 
which these principles could be upheld and applied. 
Establishing the limits to Member States’ 
discretion in enlargement negotiations 
Procedural limits
The procedure of EU enlargement is set out in Article 49 of the 
Treaty on European Union.
9
 It grants the Member States a 
pivotal role in negotiating, concluding and ratifying the 
accession treaty with the candidate state. However, the EU 
institutions are also part of the process. Accession cannot take 
place without the consent of the European Parliament. In 
addition, the European Commission must provide the Council 
with an Opinion, before the latter can take the unanimous 
decision to proceed with enlargement. 
 
Article 49 TEU has a mandatory character. Member States 
cannot enlarge the Union outside the procedure contained in 
this Article.
10
 Moreover, this procedure is aimed specifi cally at 
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extending the EU membership rights and duties to another state. 
In other words, Article 49 TEU cannot be used to establish a 
treaty which does not have the object and the effect of bringing 
the candidate country into the Union, as a full Member. 
Preservation of the acquis: A key objective of the Union
But what should an accession treaty contain? Article 49 TEU 
talks about ‘conditions of admission and… adjustments to the 
[EU] Treaties’ necessitated by enlargement. The same Article 
provides that, negotiations to determine those conditions and 
adjustments, take place between EU Member States and the 
candidate state. Negotiations are therefore intergovernmental. 
But, does this mean that the Member States have an unfettered 
freedom to defi ne the modalities of EU enlargement? That is 
what the European Court of Justice seems to suggest. In its 
ruling in the case Mattheus v Doego,
11
 the Court held that the 
provisions of Article 49 establish:
‘[a] precise procedure encompassed within well-defi ned limits 
for the admission of new Member States, during which the 
conditions of accession are to be drawn up by the authorities 
indicated in the article itself. 
Thus the legal conditions for such accession remain to be defi ned 
in the context of that procedure without it being possible to 
determine the content judicially in advance’. 
The Court concluded that it could not ‘give a ruling on the 
form or subject-matter of the conditions which might be 
adopted’. Adding that ‘it is impossible to determine the content 
of the legal conditions for admission in advance’, the Court 
appeared to preserve the full bargaining powers of negotiators 
to determine such legal conditions. 
At the same time, the Luxembourg judges pointed out that the 
procedure of Article 49 is ‘encompassed within well-defi ned 
limits’. While they did not give any indications as to the nature 
or form of those ‘well-defi ned limits’, the Commission did. In 
its observations submitted to the Court, it argued that when 
they take part in accession negotiations, States are subject to 
the following restrictions: First, derogations from Community 
law may only be of limited duration. Secondly, adjustments to 
the Treaty may only be done in so far as it proves to be 
necessary by reason of the accession. Thirdly, when making 
adjustments to the acquis, the Member States may not depart 
from the principles governing the Community. 
The Commission’s contention that there are some principles 
from which the Member States and institutions may not depart 
was subsequently hinted at by the Court in its so-called fi rst 
EEA Opinion. In particular, it found that the European 
Economic Area Agreement was incompatible with some 
provisions of the EC Treaty and ‘more generally, with the very 
foundations of the Community’ [emphasis added].
12
 
Article 2 TEU codifi es this notion. It provides that one of the 
objectives of the European Union is ‘to maintain in full the 
acquis communautaire’. Furthermore, Article 3 of the same 
Treaty stipulates that the institutions of the Union shall respect 
and build upon the acquis communautaire. Therefore, 
Member States and institutions should not come back from 
the degree of integration hitherto achieved. Indeed, observance 
of this principle is guaranteed by the European Court of 
Justice, through Article 47 TEU.
13
Another textual argument that supports the proposition that 
Member States may not derogate from the kernel of the 
Community legal order is to be found in Article 10 of the EC 
Treaty. Article 10 EC expresses the general principle of loyal 
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cooperation. One of the key elements of this principle is that 
the Member States and institutions shall abstain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives of the Treaty. Importantly, this principle applies not 
only in the context of the EC Treaty,
14
 but also governs Member 
States’ actions in the context of the EU.
15
 Arguably, the 
principle compels Member States even when they exercise their 
reserved powers, like in the fi eld of foreign policy.
16
It is my contention that the permanent safeguard clause 
mooted by the Member States in the Negotiating Framework 
for Turkey, would constitute a permanent threat to the acquis, 
thereby jeopardising the attainment of one of the key 
objectives of the Union. In particular, the clause does not sit 
easily with what must be considered to be a fundamental 
component of the acquis communautaire, namely the principle 
of non-discrimination based on nationality. 
Non-discrimination and the internal market
The principle of non-discrimination is a cornerstone of the 
internal market based on the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and persons.
17
 Specifi c expression of the general 
principle of equality,
18
 Article 12 EC states that within the scope 
of application of the EC Treaty, any discrimination on grounds 
of nationality shall be prohibited.
19
 This provision is situated in 
Part One of the EC Treaty entitled ‘principles’, indicating its 
fundamental nature.
20
 
At the same time, EU law foresees exceptions to the rights to 
equality and free movement. For instance, as regards free 
movement of workers, Article 39(4) of the EC Treaty allows 
Member States to restrict access to employment in their public 
service.
21
 Moreover, paragraph 3 of the same Article points out 
that the rights connected to the free movement of workers may 
be subject to limitations justifi ed on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health. These grounds were 
elaborated in a Council directive of 1964,
22
 which confi rmed 
that the Member States may restrict the rights of nationals of 
other Member States to enter and reside in their territory, in 
their capacity as workers, self-employed persons or service 
providers. Importantly however, restrictive measures taken by 
the Member States should be based exclusively on the personal 
conduct of the individuals concerned.
23
 
A permanent safeguard clause would confer on EU institutions
24
 
the constant ability to take away the free movement rights of 
Turkish workers, self-employed persons, or service providers, 
not because of their personal conduct, but simply because of 
their nationality. The accession treaty would thus introduce a 
differentiated enjoyment of fundamental freedoms along 
national lines. Differentiating the rights of persons who are in 
the same situation, merely on the basis of nationality is clearly 
tantamount to the type of discrimination Article 12 EC prohibits 
as a fundamental principle of the EC legal order. 
The grounds justifying Member States’ restrictions to equality 
and free movement of persons have been clarifi ed by the 
European Court of Justice. This case law was in turn codifi ed 
in the 2004 Directive on the rights of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States.
25
 
Non-discrimination and EU citizenship
However, this Directive, which entered into force in 2006,
26
 
is not only a codifi cation of existing case law. It also establishes 
that the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of 
8Christophe Hillion
nationality is no longer limited solely to individuals engaged in 
cross-border economic activities. 
The origin of this line of thought is to be found in the 
provisions on European citizenship, established by the Treaty 
on European Union signed in Maastricht.
27
 According to 
paragraph 1 of Article 17 EC, ‘[e]very person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’. 
These provisions mean that as soon as Turkey becomes a 
Member State, its nationals, as ‘nationals of a Member State’, 
acquire ipso facto European citizenship.
28
 
Paragraph 2 of the same Article stipulates that Citizens of the 
Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by the Treaty. Article 18 
of the EC Treaty clarifi es those rights by stating that ‘[e]very 
citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the 
limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect…’.
29
As regards the limitations to the right to move freely, Member 
States may, here as well, invoke public policy, public security or 
public health. However, as in the context of free movement of 
economically active EC nationals, these grounds can only justify 
restrictive measures against individuals, based on their personal 
conduct, and irrespective of their nationality.
30
 Indeed, these 
grounds cannot be invoked to serve economic ends.
31 
With 
respect to the right of residence, Member States may require that 
EU citizens do not become an unreasonable burden on their 
social assistance system.
32
More generally, and more signifi cantly, the Court of Justice 
has emphasised that European citizenship is destined to be 
the ‘fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’
33
 
enabling those who fi nd themselves in the same situation to enjoy 
the same treatment in law. Difference of treatment can be justifi ed 
only if it is based on objective considerations independent of 
nationality of the persons concerned, and provided that it is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions.
34
 
Indeed, the Court has emphasised that the status of citizen of the 
Union warrants a particularly restrictive interpretation of the 
derogations from the freedom of movement.
35
The foregoing means that it is not only the Turkish workers, 
service providers and self-employed persons who should enjoy 
the right of free movement and the right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of nationality. All Turkish 
nationals, as citizens of the Union, should enjoy these rights 
under EU law.
36
 If eventually included in the accession treaty, a 
permanent safeguard clause would however allow the EU 
institutions to take away the rights inherent in European 
citizenship, by simple decision.
37
 Put bluntly, the clause would 
entail that the Turkish nationals would not enjoy the same 
rights as other EU citizens. The EU would thus become the 
proverbial animal farm where some citizens are more equal 
than others.
38
 It is my contention that the clause would thus 
jeopardize the objective that European citizenship should be 
the fundamental status of nationals of Member States. 
One thing is to establish that an accession treaty containing 
such a permanent safeguard clause might constitute an erosion 
of the acquis communautaire. The next step is to envisage the 
means to prevent the Member States from undermining 
fundamental principles of the EU legal order. Or, put 
differently, how are the limits to Member States’ discretion in 
enlargement negotiations upheld, if at all? 
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Enforcing the limits to Member States’ discretion 
in enlargement negotiations
During negotiations
First of all, the principle whereby the Member States should 
not undermine the core elements of the acquis serves as a 
guiding principle during the accession negotiations. Indeed, 
the Negotiating Framework for Turkey stipulates in one of its 
fi rst paragraphs that ‘enlargement should strengthen the 
process of continuous… integration in which the Union and 
its Member States are engaged’.
39
 This is a guiding principle not 
only aimed at the Member States qua contracting parties,
40
 but 
also at the institutions, given their extensive involvement in the 
negotiation process. They too are expected to act in a manner 
that would prevent that an accession treaty undermines the 
fundamental principles of the Union. As guardian of the 
Treaty, the Commission has, in principle, a particular 
responsibility in this respect to ensure that the acquis is 
preserved. The European Parliament could also withhold its 
consent to proceed with accession.
That being said, principles limiting Member States’ discretion 
risk remaining ineffective if they merely serve as guiding 
principles. That leads me to examine what role, if any, the 
judiciary could play in upholding such principles.
After the end of negotiation, before ratifi cation
According to Article 46 TEU, the European Court of Justice has 
jurisdiction on the provisions governing the admission of new 
Member States, contained in Article 49 TEU.
41
 Any 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement provided 
in those provisions could therefore be challenged before the 
Court. For instance, if the Council was to proceed with 
enlargement without waiting for the European Parliament’s 
assent, the latter could challenge the legality of the Council’s 
decision on the basis of Article 230 EC.
42
 The Commission 
could also contest the admission of a new Member State if it 
were taking place outside the framework of Article 49 TEU.
However, the Court’s jurisdiction is not restricted merely to 
ensure adherence to the procedural stipulations of Article 49 
TEU. It may also ascertain that its substantive requirements are 
fulfi lled.
43
 Coming back to our initial question concerning the 
legality of including a permanent safeguard clause in an 
accession treaty with Turkey: How could the Court play a role 
to enforce the substantive limits of Member States’ discretion 
once accession negotiations are over?
One route could be the following. Suppose that one of the EU 
institutions or, although less probably, a Member State, is of 
the opinion that, by including the permanent safeguard 
clauses, the signed accession treaty fails to grant Turkey the 
fundamental assets of membership to the European Union.
On the grounds that the envisaged treaty is therefore not an 
accession treaty in the sense of Article 49 TEU, but an 
international treaty covering, among other things, large areas 
of Community competence, that State or institution could ask 
the Court of Justice to examine the compatibility of the 
provisions of that envisaged treaty with the EC treaty, and 
determine whether the Community or any Community 
institution has the power to enter into that agreement, 
alongside the Member States.
44
 According to established case 
law, it is not the label of an act that determines the Court’s 
jurisdiction, but its contents and legal effects.
45
 Obviously, if 
the Court considers that it is indeed an accession treaty in the 
sense of Article 49, it will declare the case inadmissible.
46
 The 
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treaty might then enter into force once the ratifi cation process 
is over. However, if the Court fi nds that the envisaged treaty is 
in effect a different type of treaty, notably given that it falls 
short of offering essential elements of Union membership to 
the candidate state, it could hold that agreement incompatible 
with the provisions of the EC Treaty. In particular, the Court 
could consider that the Council’s decision to sign, under a TEU 
procedure, an agreement that covers large areas of Community 
competence constitutes an act that encroaches upon the 
powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community.
Given that the provisions of Article 46 TEU appear fully to 
extend the jurisdiction of the Court to the provisions of, inter 
alia, Article 49 TEU,
47
 the Luxembourg judges could also be 
invited, following the procedure established by the sixth 
paragraph of Article 300 EC, to determine whether the 
agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of Article 
49 TEU. If the Court was of the opinion that the envisaged 
accession treaty fails to grant Turkey the fundamental assets of 
membership to the European Union, it could declare that the 
Agreement is incompatible with Article 49 TEU. 
In both scenarios, an adverse opinion of the Court of Justice 
would entail that the agreement may enter into force only in 
accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. 
For instance, the Parties would have to amend the provisions 
of Article 49 TEU, or choose a different legal basis for the 
agreement, a choice that could cause that negotiations be re-
opened to meet the procedural requirements of that new legal 
basis; or alternatively amend the accession treaty, in 
consultation with the third party, to make it compatible with 
Article 49 TEU.
The suspicion that the accession treaty is an external 
agreement in disguise could also open the way for the 
Commission to start enforcement proceedings against the 
Member States on the basis of Article 226 of the EC Treaty. The 
Commission could argue that the conclusion, under a TEU 
procedure, of an international treaty covering, among other 
things, large areas of Community competence, would ‘affect’ 
the EC Treaty within the meaning of Article 47 TEU.
48
 
After the entry into force 
But what if no institution or Member State brings the 
permanent safeguard clauses to the attention of the Court, and 
the ratifi cation of the accession treaty proceeds as planned? I 
would submit that the Court would have a key role to play in 
ensuring that the application of the contentious provisions of 
the accession treaty is consistent with the fundamentals of the 
acquis, notably the principle of non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality.
First of all, having jurisdiction over the accession treaty, the 
Court can interpret and police the application of its provisions.
49
 
Through the preliminary ruling procedure foreseen in Article 
234 EC, the Court could be invited by a judge in a Member State 
to clarify the conditions for the operation of the permanent 
safeguard mechanisms. In the same vein, the Court could be 
asked to ascertain that the provisions of the accession treaty are 
properly complied with. For instance, should the Turkish 
government fi nd that the conditions for applying one of the 
clauses have not been met when a safeguard measure was 
adopted, it could challenge the legality of that measure on the 
basis of Article 230 EC. Similarly, Turkish nationals, directly and 
individually concerned by the safeguard measure, should be in a 
position to challenge its legality on the basis of the fourth 
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paragraph of the same article. Given the Court’s long-standing 
view that derogations to the fundamental freedoms shall be 
interpreted narrowly and applied strictly,
50
 particularly in the 
context of an accession treaty,
51
 it seems likely that the 
Luxembourg judges would have the same view with respect to 
any permanent safeguard clause.
A second, more radical, option would be to ask the Court of 
Justice to hold inapplicable the contentious provisions of the 
accession treaty. More particularly, according to the procedure of 
Article 241 of the EC Treaty,
52
 known as the plea of illegality, a 
Turkish national could challenge a safeguard measure, and 
contend that the basis on which it has been adopted, namely one 
of the safeguard clauses,
53
 is itself invalid because of its 
incompatibility with fundamental principles of Community law.
Summing up, the Court should be in a position both to determine 
the strict framework within which permanent safeguard clauses 
may be used, and thus to ensure that they are not abused. It might 
also be able to declare those clauses inapplicable altogether. In all 
cases, the fundamentals of the acquis, which limit the Member 
States’ discretion during the accession process, would a fortiori 
serve as yardsticks against which the use of permanent safeguard 
clauses could be tested and controlled. 
Conclusion 
I hope that I have, in some degree, succeeded in showing fi rst, 
that there are fundamental principles of the EU legal order 
which limit Member States’ discretion in enlargement 
negotiations and secondly, that legal ways exist to ensure that 
such limits are respected. But, could it be that my worries and 
speculations are a storm in a tea cup? After all, the Negotiating 
Framework is a guiding rather than a legally binding 
document, and it is impossible clearly to predict what the 
negotiators will eventually include in the accession treaty. 
Moreover, as suggested earlier, the accession treaty will enter 
into force only once it has been ratifi ed by the contracting 
parties. In other words, national parliaments and/or citizens 
will be able to check the end result, and reject the treaty if it 
contains improper elements. 
The likelihood that the clause may eventually be included in the 
accession treaty should not be underestimated, however. 
Previous practice shows a certain degree of correspondence 
between elements envisaged in the negotiating framework and 
provisions of the eventual treaty. Democratic control is not 
suffi cient, in my view, to ensure compliance with the 
fundamentals of the acquis. The accession treaty is a package 
deal. Odd institutional mechanisms may slip through the net of 
any democratic scrutiny because on balance their inconvenience 
does not, prima facie, appear to outweigh the benefi ts of 
accession.
54
 Also, one might argue that, in the present Member 
States, the very prospect of a democratic check may actually 
create additional pressure for including such permanent 
safeguard mechanisms. One could not therefore exclude that the 
permanent safeguard clauses envisaged in the Negotiating 
Framework for Turkey fi nd their way into the fi nal accession 
treaty. It is therefore my hope that an early discussion about the 
likely tension between such clauses and EU fundamental 
principles could have a preventive role. 
From a more academic point of view, this discussion is prone 
to raising more general questions of EU institutional law. In 
particular, one may wonder whether the limits to Member 
States’ discretion in the specifi c context of accession 
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negotiations, can be transposed to other intergovernmental 
negotiations, for instance to revise the TEU? If so, can the 
Member States still be considered to be the ‘Masters of the 
Treaty’? I also hope, therefore, that through this brief analysis I 
have managed to convey to you my conviction that studying 
the nitty-gritty of the EU enlargement process – my hobby 
horse – is a fruitful exercise to expose the vital components of 
the EU constitutional order. 
Ik heb gezegd.
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